Weak electoral registration requirements are commonly thought to encourage electoral participation, but may also promote electoral fraud. For one, candidates and their supporters can more easily mobilize voters outside the district to register and vote for the candidates, even though these voters do not reside within the district. We statistically detect this classic type of electoral fraud for the first time, by taking advantage of a natural experimental setting in Japanese municipal elections. We argue that whether or not a municipal election was held in 3
INTRODUCTION
Despite its fundamental relevance to the functioning of democracy, surprisingly little is known about optimizing requirements for voter registration in order to facilitate genuine electoral participation while preventing electoral fraud. On the one hand, stricter rules discourage people from registering to vote (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960, 276-86; Powell 1986; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 196-209; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, ch. 4) . On the other hand, weak registration requirements promote electoral fraud and allow even non-eligible voters (e.g., non-resident voters) to register to vote illegally. In the first place, voter registration was introduced mainly to address this concern (Campbell 2005; Keyssar 2000) . This tradeoff has long been a target of not only academic but also partisan debates in the U.S. (Campbell 2005, 284; Minnite 2010; Piven and Cloward 2000) .
It is difficult, however, to "devise registration systems that would control fraud without shrinking the size of the active electorate" (Converse 1972, 298) . This is principally because it is hard to estimate, much less observe, fraudulent behavior, even when we have detailed turnout statistics. For obvious reasons, perpetrators of the fraudulent behavior attempt -and often manage -to conceal their cheating. Certainly, the existing literature of electoral fraud makes much use of qualitative sources. They include cases citizens have brought to the judiciary (Minnite 2010) , election disputes parties filed in the legislature (in order to nullify electoral results) (Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Oberst and Weilage 1990; Ziblatt 2009 ), international election observation reports (Birch 2007) , mass media reports (Cox and Kousser 1981; Nyblade and Reed 2008) , and archival materials (Campbell 2005) . These anecdotal sources are often insightful, but not immune to underreporting the scale of electoral fraud on the whole due to the covert nature of fraud, or overreporting due to the partisanship of those who produce the original materials (Minnite 2010) . In short, as Alvarez, Hall and Hyde (2008, 3 ) lament, to date there has been "little systematic research on how election fraud can be detected and deterred."
This article addresses this lacuna, by examining fraudulent electoral registration and detecting it statistically using the case of Japan. In this country, citizens who change their residential address must register it at a municipality office within two weeks. Three months later, voting-age adults are automatically registered to vote in the municipality without an additional voter registration process. Some voters change their registered addresses before the election for the purpose of voting, and we call this behavior "pre-electoral residential registration." In many cases, candidates and their supporters allegedly ask voters outside the district to change their registered address to the district and to vote for the candidates. Given an automatic electoral registration process and relatively simple requirements for residential registration, which we explain further later, most of these "relocaters" allegedly transfer their registered address on paper without changing their actual residence, in which case their behavior is illegal.
1 Since this tactic is inherently covert, it is difficult to know how commonly people are engaged in it and whether it is an important factor shaping election outcomes.
We make statistical inference about this electoral behavior by taking advantage of a natural experimental setting. In a nutshell, we argue, whether or not a municipal election was held in April 2003 can be regarded as an "as-if" randomly assigned treatment for reasons explained shortly. If this assumption holds, we can reasonably attribute a difference between the increase in "relocated" residential registration in treatment municipalities (with an election) and the increase in control municipalities (without an election) only to the effect of having an election on pre-electoral residential registration. The effects estimated by difference-in-difference models 1 Article 236, Sections 1 and 2, Public Officers Election Act (POEA).
are significant and, in some cases, decisive enough to change the electoral results, especially when the election is competitive.
This study intends to make a substantive and methodological contribution to the broader literature. First, we statistically detect pre-electoral residential registration, which is a variant of a classic kind of electoral fraud, "voting from nonresidential addresses" (Minnite 2010 , 49, 53, see also Campbell 2005 ) by "ghost voters" (Campbell 2005, 195; Hyde 2008, 206, 214) or "phantom voters" (Campbell 2005, 124, 195, 283; Sadiq 2009, 142 ). As we explore in the next section, the practice was and is common across African, American, Asian, and European countries. No one, however, has ever estimated how many people are engaged in it. To our knowledge, this article provides robust inference of such fraudulent behavior for the first time.
This is an essential step in an inquiry into the optimal requirements for electoral registration.
Second, we add "electoral timing as treatment" to the toolkit of political science by demonstrating its usefulness. When an election is approaching, parties and candidates are more inclined to do everything they can do, either legally or illegally. One problem with examining such "electoral connection [s] " (Mayhew 1974 ) is that we cannot manipulate the occurrence of elections. If we find a variation in the election timing across geographical units, however, it is possible to estimate the treatment effects of an election per se on a range of outcome variables, by comparing treatment units (with an election) and control units (without an election). In the concluding section, we will present the contexts, other than Japanese municipality elections, in which electoral timing as a treatment variable can be exploited.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section summarizes newspaper reports on pre-electoral residential registration in Japan, and argues that the highly competitive nature of Japanese local elections motivates candidates to engage in it. We also explore similar examples of voting from nonresidential addresses in many other countries. After reviewing statistical methods used in existing studies to detect electoral fraud, the third section elaborates on our natural experimental design and derives two hypotheses. The following section specifies difference-in-difference models, describes data, and clarifies our predictions. After showing and discussing the estimated results in the penultimate section, we conclude by summarizing our findings and discussing alternative setups where "election timing as treatment" might be applied.
PRE-ELECTORAL RESIDENTIAL REGISTRATION
To repeat, we define pre-electoral residential registration as the change of registered address from one municipality to another before the election for the purpose of voting. In this section, we begin by summarizing patterns of this behavior based on reports found in newspapers. Second, we highlight an important institutional factor underlying such behavior; that is, the extremely competitive nature of municipal elections. Finally, we call attention to the fact that pre-electoral residential registration is by no means specific to Japan but commonly found elsewhere.
Patterns of Pre-Electoral Residential Registration
In Japan, pre-electoral residential registration has been periodically mentioned by legislators in the legislature, the Diet, 2 as well as investigated as a form of electoral fraud. To which address do they change their registration? Typically used addresses (only for the purpose of registration) include candidates' (or their core supporters') homes, the electoral campaign headquarters, and offices or housing provided for employees of companies controlled by candidates (or their core supporters). It is common that candidates select a specific address for the purpose of pre-electoral residential registration, with more than a dozen people with different family names appearing to have moved from different places to live in the same house. In an extreme case, 202 people registered their residence as a small house of only about 240 square meters.
7
How is this type of electoral fraud feasible? It is the simplicity of the registration process:
Japanese people can easily change their registered address by submitting a simple form without presenting evidence of actual relocation (e.g., water and electricity bills). Moreover, anyone can be a proxy for people "registering" before an election, and can do paperwork on their behalf. In one case, an agent changed the addresses of 128 people in a day. 8 It is important to note that candidates can monitor whether those who are asked to engage in pre-electoral residential 7 Asahi Shimbun, May 9, 1990.
8 Asahi Shimbun, April 20, 1987. registration did, indeed, do so because a list of eligible voters for a specific election is publicly available.
How do those "relocaters" then vote? Do they actually cast their own ballots? Based on the residence registry, the electoral commission office of a corresponding municipality mails the correct number of voting tickets (i.e., tickets to the polling stations) for all voters at a particular address. On behalf of allegedly "new" voters, actual residents may pass the tickets to other supporters in the municipality who may illegally cast more than one ballot by impersonating. Alternatively, those who are mobilized but still live in other municipalities may travel to the district, receive tickets from someone actually residing in the "moved-in" address, and utilize early voting or vote on Election Day.
10
When does pre-electoral residential registration commonly take place? In many cases, "relocaters" change their address just before the deadline of eligibility, three months before the election. (We will explain the timing of pre-electoral residential registration more in detail in a later section.) Usually, after the election, they move their residential registration back to where they actually live.
11
Politicians and government officials might argue that these cases are exceptions, but numerous newspaper reports imply that illegal pre-electoral residential registration is common in some communities and, therefore, an open secret: residents have no sense of guilt in the first place and public officials, who process paperwork and send multiple (even numerous) voting tickets to a single address, pretend not to know about (or, rather, are sometimes complicit in) 9 For example, Asahi Shimbun, December 7, 1991 and April 27, 1998. 10 For example, Asahi Shimbun, July 9, 1985 , April 30 and May 15, 1987 and July 17, 1994 11 For example, Asahi Shimbun, July 17, 1994 and October 14, 1995. 
Close Competition in Municipal Elections
There remains an important question: why do candidates, particularly those in municipal elections, promote this type of electoral fraud? The literature points out that the higher the level of political competitiveness, the more likely it is that politicians commit acts of electoral fraud.
For example, Birch (2007) writes, "[c] andidates in marginal positions are most likely to benefit from electoral malpractice, for their expected gain is highest in relation to their expected loss in terms of potential damage to reputation" (pp. 1538-39). 13 Since a small number of votes may change the outcome of an election, local elections, like close national elections, are an all too common locus of electoral fraud (Alvarez, Hall and Hyde 2008, 12) . Some studies suggest that the degree of intra-party competition also affects the likelihood of candidates engaging in fraudulent activities. Where candidates from the same party compete with one another, they seek 12 Supreme Court Judgment, January 22, 1985 , Osaka High Court Judgment, April 19, 1985 Other extreme cases reported in newspapers are the village of Ieshima, Hyogo Prefecture, in 1994 (where around 600 citizens claimed to move) and the village of Kuriyama, Tochigi Prefecture, in 1995 (Asahi Shimbun, July 13 and 17, 1994; September 27 to 29, 1995) .
13 Nyblade and Reed (2008, 928) and Lehoucq and Molina (2002) also present similar views.
to acquire "personal votes" distinguishing them from others running for office with the same party label and, therefore, have incentives to be engaged in electoral fraud (Carey and Shugart 1995; Chang and Golden 2006) . "Intraparty competition is less likely to involve competition over issues and government responsibility and more likely to involve pork-barrel politics and expensive personalistic appeals, increasing demand for illegal campaign activities" (Nyblade and Reed 2008, 929) .
Japanese municipality elections satisfy both of these common conditions for electoral fraud; they are highly competitive and electoral competition is not only between but also within parties. This is a product of the Japanese electoral system; namely, in assembly elections, each municipality in principle constitutes an at-large electoral district (i.e., one district for one municipality) and the number of seats ranges from 12 to 96, depending on the population size.
Every voter has a single vote; that is, he/she votes for only one candidate. Winners are decided simply based on the total number of votes each candidate garners, and redundant or futile votes are not transferred to other fellow candidates (e.g., candidates from the same party). 14 Under this single non-transferable vote system, the vote margins between candidates tend to be extraordinarily small and dozens of candidates run from the same party or camp.
15 Figure 1 illustrates an example of the distribution of votes in an assembly election in a 14 The mayoral election system is essentially the same, except that the number of seats per district is one. 15 In Japanese municipality elections, many candidates run as independents, because party labels do not necessarily help them to differentiate themselves from other competitors. In reality, however, they are often from the same camp (e.g. conservatives) and battle to win support within the same constituency. municipality with the median population size (about ten thousand), the city of Taneichi in Iwate Prefecture.
[ Figure 1 around here] According to a more extensive study on municipal assembly elections held between 1987
and 1998 in two prefectures (Saga and Fukuoka), the vote margin between the last winner and the runner up is less than 50 votes in two-thirds of these municipalities and less than ten, including zero, in about 20 percent of them (Horiuchi 2005, Table 5.4, 86) . 16 Political scientists and economists have long assumed that "[t]he probability of being decisive… in an election with more than a handful of voters is always small, usually very small, and sometimes infinitesimally small" (Fisher 1999, 267 ; also see Riker and Ordeshook 1968) . The literature of electoral fraud also has not previously found any evidence that fraud changes electoral results (Lehoucq 2003) , although competitiveness is the main driver for it. In Japanese municipal elections, however, even a small increase in the number of votes can affect who gets elected. Not surprisingly, such extraordinarily small vote margins give a strong incentive for candidates and their core supporters to mobilize voters, even from outside the district.
16 If the last winner and the runner up receive the exactly same number of votes, a winner is decided by a random draw. Horiuchi (2005, 84) found three cases in his sample of 442 districts.
Voting from Non-Residential Addresses
Before shifting from qualitative to quantitative analysis to obtain systematic evidence of pre-electoral residential registration, we want to emphasize that pre-electoral residential registration is a variant of a classic electoral fraud -voting from nonresidential addresses, which has been, and still is, found in many countries. Campbell (2005) There are many other stories outside the U.S. In Britain, the residency requirement for electors was not enforced from the 15th to 18th centuries even before it was formally repealed in 1773 (Hutcheson 1997) . In the first half of the twentieth century, Costa Rican parties allegedly "packed the electoral registry with dead or nonexistent individuals" or those who "lacked a 17 Keyssar (2000, 159) also describes floaters.
permanent residence" (Lehoucq and Molina 2002, 40, 99) . They also transported railroad employees to the districts the employees were not registered and forced them to vote (Lehoucq and Molina 2002, 185-88) . In postwar Malaysia, the governing party, UMNO, legalized illegal immigrants from the Philippines and Indonesia by way of a document fraud, so that they could vote for UMNO (Sadiq 2005 (Sadiq , 2009 . Similarly, some illegal immigrants from Afghanistan were registered to vote in Pakistan, with similar movements from Bangladesh to India, from Nigeria to Cameroon, from Togo to Ghana and from Burkina Faso to the Ivory Coast (Sadiq 2005 (Sadiq , 2009 ).
Pre-electoral residential registration is reportedly found in Korea as well. 18 In Solomon Islands, many residents were allegedly imported from island to island to be registered and vote.
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NATURAL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
The previous section suggest that pre-electoral residential registration or voting from nonresidential addresses may be rampant, while we suspect that the crime statistics under-represent reality. Then, how do we know how many people actually are engaged in it? To answer this, we need to cross an important hurdle -the difficulty of identifying whether or not changing one's address (regardless of actual residence) is motivated by electoral fraud or not.
Thanks to a natural experimental setup in Japan, however, we can cope with this problem and make valid causal inference.
In this section, we first review some existing statistical studies to detect electoral fraud and argue the advantage of natural experimental design. We then explain why we assume that our treatment variable is an as-if random assignment. The third part derives a hypothesis about the timing of pre-electoral residential registration. Finally, we propose another hypothesis about how competitiveness affects its magnitude.
Existing Approaches to Detect Electoral Fraud
In the literature detecting electoral fraud, scholars have traditionally relied on qualitative sources, as we mentioned in the introduction. These provide useful indications, but are presumably the tip of the iceberg and are insufficient for us to draw a comprehensive picture.
A handful of recent studies try to detect only partially observable fraudulent activities using various methods of statistical inference. One is a model-based approach, where scholars estimate some statistical (e.g., regression) models and examine irregularities, anomalies or outliers (Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2009; Wand et al. 2001) . For example, Alvarez and
Katz (2008) reasonably calling attention to doubtful cases which require further investigation. Once readers consider, however, the existence of relevant omitted variables, 20 the mis-specified functional 20 In the case of Alvarez and Katz (2008) , to be more precise, they regress the county-level Democratic vote shares for gubernatorial and senatorial candidates of Georgia in 1998 on the vote share for president in 1996 and the percentage of non-white population. Then, using the coefficient estimates and the same independent variables (but for 2000, rather than 1996), they predict the dependent variable in the 2002 elections. They admit that they "lack many of the sorts of variables that political scientists might use in such a forecasting model" (p. 155). One such form, or the wrong distributive assumption of an error term, the validity of any model-dependent analysis can be called into question. This approach also "ignores the fraud that can occur regularly" (Campbell 2005, 26 , emphasis added).
An alternative is a design-based approach, in particular, a natural experiment, which we consider a more convincing method offering valid and robust causal estimates. 21 For example,
Hyde (2007) variable is an economic variable, e.g., personal income, which is correlated with not only gubernatorial and senatorial but also presidential candidates' vote shares. Therefore, the omission of personal income might produce biased coefficient estimates, and in turn lead to biased prediction.
21 Another non-model based method is to apply Benford's Law (Mebane 2008) or to pay attention to frequency of ultra-close races (Christensen and Colvin 2009 , 1951, 1955, 1959, ... , 2003, 2007, 2011) on the fourth Sunday in April.
Today, however, a significant proportion of municipalities do not hold their elections during these simultaneous local elections (hereafter SLE). Once an election is held off the SLE cycle for whatever reason, the following elections usually remain off the SLE cycle, because the length of the subsequent term is always four years, not the remainder of the previous term. In our analysis, we focus on timing and reasons for the last deviation from the cycle for each control municipality.
Specifically, in the case of the 2003 SLEs, among 3,105 municipalities we study, 51.6%
of municipalities held assembly and 21.4% mayoral elections on April 27, 2003. 23 We call 22 Since this key assumption is difficult to satisfy, a natural experiment has been rarely used in the statistical studies of electoral fraud. In a comprehensive review, Lehoucq (2003, 235-36) does not even mention natural experiments as an effective tool to study electoral fraud. 23 A special law, which is made every four years, stipulates that when mayoral and assembly terms expire between March 1 and May 31, in principle, the elections should be held on the whether or not each municipal assembly or mayoral election was held on April 27, 2003 the "legislative treatment" or the "executive treatment", respectively. This cross-municipality variation provides a unique opportunity to study the effects of a municipal election.
Figure 2 displays the cumulative percentages of municipalities in the "legislative control"
group, which did not hold an assembly election on April 27, 2003, or the "executive control"
group, which did not hold a mayoral election on the same day, by years and reasons for deviation from SLEs.
[ Figure 2 around here] Clearly, we do not argue that all moving to the treatment group in January 2003 is fraudulent. If we observe, however, significant difference between the treatment and control groups only in January 2003, we are inclined to believe that it is pre-electoral residential registration.
Hypothesis 2: Competitiveness
In the previous section, we argued that electoral competitiveness encourages pre-electoral residential registration. One way to confirm that is to compare the size of treatment effects by the municipality population size, according to which electoral competitiveness varies. Article 91 of the Local Autonomy Law stipulates that the maximum municipal assembly size is a non-linear step function of municipal population size, which can be roughly approximated by a natural log 28 The deadlines are not exactly three months before due to procedural issues.
of the population size. For example, the maximum number of seats is 12 for municipalities with less than 2,000 residents, while it is 34 for municipalities with more than or equal to 100,000 but less than 200,000 residents. Thus, the assembly size rises only around threefold, even when the population size centuplicates. The typical number of candidates is slightly larger than the number of seats.
Therefore, as the population size decreases, the vote margin between candidates, which is correlated with the average number of votes each legislator represents, tends to decrease (Horiuchi 2005, 
STATISTICAL METHOD
This section introduces our statistical method to detect pre-electoral residential registration. We first specify a difference-in-difference model and give a rationale of applying this model for our analysis. Second, we make four different datasets to address heterogeneous treatment effects.
Finally, we clarify the prediction of coefficient estimates.
Difference-in-Difference Model
In estimating the legislative treatment effect, we set the following baseline model: may explain why people move into a particular municipality at a particular time.
In the case of the same month m of the previous year t−1, it follows:
By subtracting the second equation from the first, we obtain:
where ∆ is the difference operator, In a similar fashion, we derive the model of the executive treatment effect: possible, but it would become computationally intensive as our specification has numerous (more than 36,000) dummy variables. 34 In our preliminary analysis, we also estimated the treatment effects with some pretreatment variables controlled, but the substantive implications do not change. 
Four Datasets
We assume that each treatment effect is conditional on the value of the other treatment. For example, the legislative treatment effect might be larger when there is no mayoral election (i.e., ET i = 0), compared to when there is a mayoral election (i.e., ET i = 1). As core supporters of legislative and mayoral candidates may overlap, legislative candidates can mobilize more voters when a mayoral election is not held than when mayoral candidates are also eager to mobilize the voter pool.
Given this possibility of treatment effect heterogeneity, we divide the dataset into two in two ways and estimate average treatment effects for four datasets; (1) the legislative treatment effect in the executive control group (municipalities II (N=1,130) against IV (N=1,311) in Table   1 , total N=2,441), (2) the legislative treatment effect in the executive treatment group (municipalities I (N=471) against III (N=193), total N=664), (3) the executive treatment effect in the legislative control group (municipalities III against IV, N=1,504), and (4) the executive treatment effect in the legislative treatment group (municipalities I against II, N=1,601).
[ Table 1 around here] More formally, we estimate the following: [ Figure 5 around here] These results suggest that pre-electoral residential registration is more common in smaller municipalities. This supports our Hypothesis 2.
RESULTS
Estimates
Discussion
Some might be afraid that the estimated treatment effects are not large enough to be decisive in an election. As noted earlier, however, in Japanese municipality assembly elections, single-digit votes can be pivotal in determining who gets elected. In our sample, the monthly average number (=100*exp(0.092)−100) if a mayoral election is not held (the top panel in Figure 3 ). Thus, as many as an extra eleven (=111*0.096) people moved into legislative treatment municipalities as compared to legislative control municipalities. This is large enough to switch the last winner and the runner up in nearly a quarter of municipal assembly elections as noted earlier and a small enough number of votes for candidates to mobilize. We emphasize that the effect does exist and
we can detect such a small electoral trick using this natural experiment.
Skeptical readers might come up with two alternative interpretations of our results above. Considering how rarely pre-electoral residential registration is caught, this scenario is highly unlikely, as well.
This linking of government services to residential address is a major reason why those who commit pre-electoral residential registration are sometimes employees (whose health insurance, unlike that of the self-employed, does not depend on where they live), young students (who have no children), and gangsters (who disregard these services). It is true that they will still suffer from lack of some public services, as well as having to undertake paperwork at municipality offices, but they are ready to do so for the purpose of voting and, presumably, for benefits or lack of punishment given by candidates or core supporters.
CONCLUSION
Based on Japan's institutional settings, which produce an as-if random assignment of election timings, we estimated the impacts of having an election on what we call pre-electoral residential registration -the cross-municipality change of registered address for the purpose of voting. Our difference-in-difference estimates suggest that people do, indeed, move (at least, on paper)
before an election and the magnitude of the effect of this is substantial, particularly in small towns and villages where assembly elections tend to be highly competitive.
We suggest that our approach -"electoral timing as treatment" -can be applied to a number of other important contexts. One example is local elections. In G7 countries except France, at least, not all subnational governments of the same level hold elections concurrently. To examine the U.S. in detail, 40 gubernatorial elections have departed from the presidential cycle in various years (Moore, Preimesberger, and Tarr 2001, 1378-79 and ch. 30 Note: The figure shows the OLS regression coefficients and their 99% confidence intervals of each treatment variable multiplied by a month dummy. The outcome variable is the log-ratio of relocated residential registration to the same month of the previous year.
